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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
MILLER PONTIAC, INC.,
a Utah corporation, d/b/a
LAURY MILLER PONTIAC,
' Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs..,,
JANET Sci OSBORNE,
Defendant-Appellant~

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case Noc 16847

* * * * * * *
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

* * * * * * *
NATURE OF THE CASE
· This

is

an

action by plaintiff

to recover

damages as a result of defendant's breach of contract.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The trial court determined that plaintiff and
defendant had entered into a conditional sale contract
and that plaintiff met and comp! ied with the terms of
the contract.
ant breached

The Court further held that the defendthe

terms of

the contract and rendered
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Judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant for plaintiff's damages resulting from the defendant's breach.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff-respondent

~eeks

aff innation of the

trial court's Judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant-appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The defendant.' s

son,

Don Osborne.,

came

to

plaintiff's place of business on March 20, 1978, and
looked at a Pontiac automobile known as a •Macho".
re~urned

He

later the same day with the defendant and the

defendant entered into a conditional sale contract to
purchase the vehicle from plaintiff.

(R. 98, 105)

The

vehicle which defendant purchased was characterized as
a "high performance car" (R. 98} and a •hot
19)

ca~··

(R.

Defendant's son gave plaintiff a check for the sum

of $1,500.00 but later stopped payment on the check (R.
124, 125) due to certain problems with insurance which
are not relevant to this appeal.

-2-

Defendant later
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signed a .second conditional sale contract with plaint i f f which is the subject matter of this action.

(R.

Defendant and her son took possession of the

127)

vehicle and gave plaintiff a second check for .the sum
of

$1,SOOoOOe

check&>

but

payment

was

also

stopped

this

on

(Re·· 127)

Defendant's son drove the car for the period
of

approximately March

during

which

meter"

(Re

time

3;'500

20 6

1978

to April

miles were

put

15,

on

vehicle

performed

the- odQce

Defendant's son then testified that

127)

the engine blew up and he called plaintiff to·
the

1978,

away

repairs

(Re

6)

to

214)

~me

tow

Plaintiff's employees

the vehicle and ·found

that the

rear wheels were worn quite a bit more than the front

wheels (Re 151, 152, 170), the clutch plate had heat
cracks and

was

excessively burnt

(R..

152,

170),

the

push rods were bent {R .. 143, 144, 171), and the lifters
were bent { R., 143, 144)..
employees

indicated

The testimony of plaintiff's

that the damages they found were

caused by "popping the clutch•

{R •. 152).

and "excessive

r.p.m." (R. 170).
After notifying plaintiff to come and pick up
the vehicle, defendant's son told plaintiff that he

-3-
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would take the vehicle back if plaintiff would· put a

{R. 218)

new engine in the vehicle.

Plaintiff respon-

ded that repairs would have to be made at the expense
of def end ant and her son.
ployees repaired

( R. 219)

Plaintiff's em-

the vehicle and subsequently resold

the vehicle and brought this action.

(R. 149, 150)

The trial of this matter was ultimately set
for June 11 ,- 1979,
50)

after several continuances.

( R.

On the day of trial, defendant's counsel moved the

Court for a ·continuance on the basis that his client
was not present.
indicated

that

{R. 92)
he

had

.However, defendant's counsel
sent

a

letter

advising her of the trial setting.
was given
trial.
and

the

calling

for

the defendant's

to

defendant,

{ R. 92)

No reason

failure

to · appear for

Thereafter, the Court denied defendant's Motion
trial
four

proceeded,
witnesses,

with·

defendant's

including

counsel

defendant's

son,

introducing documentary evidence, and arguing the case
to

the Court.

The

trial

court entered Judgment in

favor of plaintiff and against defendant.

-4-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE GRANTING OR DENYING OF A MOTION
FOR CONTINUANCE IS LEFT TO THE SOUND
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND
SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED ON APPEAL
ABSENT A STRONG SHOWING OF ABUSE~
Th.e

appellant

argues

that

the

trial

court

abused its discretion when it denied appellant 1 s Motion
for. Continuance

and

required

appellant.' s

proceed to ·trial in her absencec

counsel

Rule 40(b)

of

to
the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that postponement

of a trial or proceeding is left to the discretion of

the Court and should be granted for good cause showne
This statutory ·principle is reiterated in Griffith v.
Hammon, 560 Pe2d 1375 (Utah, 1977) wherein the Supreme
Court held that:
wA party is not granted a continuance
as a matter of right, but rather as
an act of discretion by the court . . • • "
In that case,

the matter was

set for

trial and

the

defendants promptly objected based upon their counsel's
inability to appear on the date set because of a previously scheduled appearance in another District Court
on the same day.

There were no Law & Motion days held

from the date of filing of the objection and the trial
date

and,

subsequently,

the

-5-

objection

was

never
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heard.
Court

Defendants did
entered

Judgment

to

reversed,

the

the

not appear

defendants'

plaintiffs.

at

trial

default

and

On appeal,

and

the

awarded

this

Court

finding that the defendants had made timely

objection,

given

necessary

notice,

and

had

made

a

reasonable effort to have the trial date changed for
good cause.

In the instant case, however, appellant

made no objection to the trial setting, did not give
notice, and made no reasonable effort to have the trial
date changed until the morning of the trial.

Even at

that late hour, appellant's counsel provided no explanation for appellant's absence,· nor did he proffer any
evidence which would be had should appellant be present.

In fact, appellant's son was present, was know-

ledgable concerning the facts of the matter, and testified on behalf of the appellant.
Appellant relies on
Johnson,

13 U.2d 269,

the

case of

373 P. 2d 375

( 1962),

Bair as v.
in which

this Court reversed a denial of a Motion for Continuance.

However,

the facts of that case are _clearly

distinguishable from the instant case.
In Bairas,

the plaintiff was confined

hospital following an automobile accident.

to a

Trial was

set for June 28, 1961, and on June 22, plaintiff's

-6-
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counsel filed a Motion to Vacate the Trial Setting for
the reason that plaintiff was hospitalized in California

and

unable

travel

to

to

Utah.

The

Motion was

accompanied by an .Affidavi_t of plaintiff's attending
that plaintiff was not physically able to

physicianv

make the trip to Utah at this time,. but that the phys-able tO do so in

ician believ.ed that plaintiff

~al.d be

approximately-three months.

The Motion was argued to

the Court on June 260

The Court granted a continuance

to September 20, 1961, and further ordered that should
the plaintiff

be

unable to appear for trial at that

date, his depositon will be taken by his counsel for

use at the

trlar~

Plaintiff was subsequently unable to

attend the trial on September 20, and his counsel moved
for a continuancee

The Motion was supported by another

Affidavit from plaintiff's attending physician and one
from plaintiff's California counsel to the effect that
it was

believed plaintiff could attend

until. three

days

prior

to

trial"'

the trial

up

The ·trial . court

denied plaintiff's Motion for Continuance, proceeded to
trial 6

judice.

and

entered

On appeal,

a Judgment of Dismissal with Pre-·
this Court reversed and. remanded

for a new trial, stating:
"The reviewing court should not reverse the trial court's continuance
ruling without a showing that the
-7-
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trial court has abused its discretion .. "
In
provided

the

for

Moreover,

instant

case,

no

reason

was

the . absence of . the appellant at

appellant's

Continuance ·nor

counsel

gave

any

made

Notice

no

Motion

thereof

ever
trial.
for

until

a

the

morning of trial.· _Furthermore, appellant's counsel did
not indicate any evidence which would be forthcoming
had appellant been present at trial, while in Bairas,
one of the underlying reasons for the Court's reversal
was

the

finding

that

the

plaintiff's

testimony was

Here, the appellant's son was

essential to his case.

present and testified at trial and had as much knowledge, if not more, concerning the facts of this matter, as the appellant.
The· rule that a Motion for Continuance is in
the sound discretion of the trial court is followed in
other jurisdictions.
of

Olathe,

589

P.2d

In Security National Bank v. City
589

(Kans.,

1979),

the

Kansas

Supreme Court on appeal refused to disturb the trial
court's

holding

Mccrary v.

Bill

absent

a

clear

sign

of

.McCarty Construction Co.,

abuse.
Inc.,

In
591

P.2d 683 (N.M. App., 1979), the court held that a grant
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or denial of a Motion for Continuance is within the
discretion of
viewed

for

the

trial court and would only be re-

an abuse of discretion.

Finally,

In The

Matter of Swartzfager, 595 P.2d 508 (O_rec App., 1979),
the

court

addressed

stated

Motion

a

that

for

Continuance

is

to the sound discretion of the trial court

and its action thereon will not be reviewed except for
a clear abuse of discretion..

adoption

proceeding

and 6

as

That case

in Bair as,

concerned an
one

party's

physical inability to attend trial established a iight
to the continuanceo
physical

In the present case there was no

inability to attend

trial,

no apparent con-

flict of dates, and no other reason given which would
constitute "good cause"

for permitting a continuance.

In Mahoney v. Linder, 514 P.2d 901, {Ore. App., 1973),
the court held that a denial of continuance of a hearing

on

error,

the

merits

where

the

of

an

father

adoption
had

failed

petition

was

not

to keep his

at-

torney, who had notice of the hearing, advised of his
whereabouts.

The appellant in this case was aware of

the proceedings against her and counsel had sufficient
notice of the trial date.
contained

in appellant's

From the Statement of Facts
Brief,

it appears

that her

counsel was unable to locate her in order to notify her
of the trial date, although he did send a letter to her
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advising her of the trial setting.
be

the

same

fact

This would seem to

situation dealt with by the Oregon

Court in Mahoney and the same rule of law applied, as
previously enunciated by this Court.
POINT I I
APPELLANT MAY NOT RAISE THE ISSUE
OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 70A-9-501 A?i4-0
504, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953, AS
AMENDED) FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
Th~

Utah Supeme Court has long held that it

will not review a matter raised for the first time on
appeal.

In Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah, 1977),

the Court held that a matter not ·raised at trial cannot
be raised on appeal.

In that case, the appellant in a

Motion for a New Trial asserted that the

trial court

had erred in not al lowing a set-off for the value of
certain improvements.

On appeal, this Court held that

the matter had not been raised at trial and there was
no abuse of discretion in denying the Motion for a New
Trial as

th~ e~idence

required

under

ure.

Rule

had not been newly discovered as
59,

Utah

Rules

of

Civir Proced-

In an earlier case, Wagner v. Olsen, 25 U.2d 366,

482 P.2d 702.(1971), this Court stated:
"Matters neither raised in the pleadings nor'put in issue at trial cannot
be raised for the first time on aopeal."
•
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Appellant first raised

the issue of

failure

to comply with Section 70A-9-501 and 504 in her Object~
ions

to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
enter~

Law and Judgment submitted after the trial court

ed Judgment 'in favor of the respondent.

This issue-was

not set forth in the pleadings nor was it put at issue

during

the

trial..

As

in Edgar,

appellant made her

objections pursuant to the provisions of ·Rules 59 and
60"

After the entry

of

Judgment those objections were

denied by the trial courte
raised

in the

trial

Clearly the matter was not

thus may not be asserted on

and

appeal.
American

States

Insurance

Co.

v.

Miller,

Adams and Crawford, 557 P.2d 756 (Utah, 1976} appears
dispos i ti ve here.
ted

defendants

In that case, the trial court gran-

Motion
The

to

Default

Judgment.

alleged

agreement entered

Compel

basis

of

Satisfaction
the

into between

Motion

of

a

was

an

the plaintiff

and defendants after the Judgment bad been entered, and
made reference to certain notice provisions of the Utah
Uniform Commercial

Code.

This Court found

that

the

issue had not been raised prior to trial and that it:
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"· • • [C]ame as an afterthought
and showed up first in the memo-randum of authorities after change
of counsel, and in the briefs on
appeal."
The Supreme Court cited the provisions of Rule 8(c) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Proced-ure, which Rule requires
that affirma.tive defenses be set forth in the plead-

ings.
Zions First National Ban.le v. Hurst, 570 P.2d
~1977)

(Utah,

1031

is also controlling.

In ·that case

the defendant-appellant argued" that the plaintiff had
failed to notify him of the time and place

of the sale

of five airplanes used as collateral for a loan.

This

Court found that Section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Annotated
( 19 5 3,

as

amended) ,

requires

that

the

shall give notice to the

debtor~

had

the· pleadings,

not

trial

of

been

raised

in

the

issue,

nor a

disadvantage

to

the

However 1

showing of

defendant.

secured

This

party

the matter

there was no
any damage or

Court

further

stated:
More importantly, the usual rule is
that failure to so notify does not
release the debtor from a deficiency
that may arise1 but upon such failure
he may get credit for (or recover)
only for any loss caused by the failure to so notify.
[{Section 70A-9-507,
Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended)}

-12-
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In the present case, as in Hurst, there was

no substantial or prejudicial error or any injustice
resulting from· the failure to notify appellant of the

salee

Even· if

appeal~

the :failure to notify is not fatal and would

appellant could

raise

this issue on

not release ·appellant-debtor from the deficiency
ing from sale·of the caro
ation v.

Wollgast,

521

aris~

In Com:merci~l Credit Corpor-

Pe2d 1191

(Wash. App.,

1974),

the Court held· that the only pena.l ty for failure
give proper -.notice of the sale· of collateral is
debtor 9 s

to ..
the

right ·to recover from the creditor any loss

caused by the failure to give such notice.

The Court

determined that the failure to give proper notice did
not deprive the creditor of its right to a Deficiency
Judgment especially since the sale was made in a com-mercially reasonable manner and the debtor had failed .
to establish· ·any damage by virtue of method, manner,
time and terms of the sale.

Similarly, in this case,

the failure to give notice is irrelevant where the sale
of the automobile was made in a commercially

re~sonable

manner pursuant to established procedures in the used
car business*'

Appellant makes no allegation that the

resale of the vehicle was not made in a commercially
reasonable manner and has made no showing of damages
resulting from respondent's resale of the automobile.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED
DAMAGES TO RESPONDENT FOR APPELLANT'S BREACH OF CONTRACT.

In breach of contract cases, it is the general rule that the non-breaching party should receive an
award which will put him in as good a position as he
would have been had there been no breach of contract.
Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 U.2d 1, 455 P.2d 197
(1969).

In order to return respondent to the position

in which it would have been had there been no breach of
contract,

appellant must pay the damages

incurred by

respondent.
Appellant cites errors in the trial court's
award
cord.

of

damages

which

are

not

supported by

the

re-

Appellant alleges in her Brief that the trial

court awarded respondent lost profits which were not
lost.

However, the testimony at trial indicated that

respondent would have earned a profit of $829.00 on the
contract between respondent and appellant had appellant
not breached the contract.

{R.

148).

The testimony

further indicated that the profit received by respondent on

the

resale

of

the

automobile was

the

$150.00, which was off set by storage costs,
fees, advertising, and other charges.
-14-

sum of
interest

(R. 166).
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Appellant also cites error in

the award of

the sum of $100.00 for "expense of processing".
ever,

How-

the evidence at trial was that this represented

respondent's

expenses

incurred

in

the

processing

of

each sale of a vehicle and was incurred in the· sale to
respondent,as

well

as

in

the

resale of

the vehicle.

(R., 148).

Appellant cites error in the award of commissions

in the sum of $392001,

but appears

contesting $88.00 of that sum.

to be only

This amount was earned

by one of respondent's salesman but was never paid due
to the breach of the contract by appellant.

However,

it was a damage suffered by respondent due to appellant's breach and, as such, was recoverable.in order to
place respondent in the position it would have been but
for the breach of contract.
Appellant cites error in the award of profit
from

a

service

contract

in

the

sum

of

$260. 00

and

alleges that the record is that only 35% of this would
have been lost had the second purchaser on resale not
taken a service contract.
purchaser

on

resale

The fact that a subsequent

elected

to

purchase

a

service

contract has no bearing on the damages suffered by the
respondent

due

to

appellant's

breach

of

contract.

Respondent earned a new prof it on a service contract on
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that sale which is irrelevant to the issue of damages
in this case.
Finally,
court's

award

of

appellant
the

sum

complains

of

of

$1,018.56

the

for

trial

repairs

respondent made to the vehicle, alleging that the cost
of

those

repairs

$778.91Q
breach

to

respondent was

only

the sum of

Appellant ignores the fact that, but for the
of

contract,

appellant

would

have

paid

the

retail. cost of the repairs in the sum of $1 , 018. 56 and
this is the amount of damages suffered by respondent.
The trial court heard the evidence and carefully

considered

awarded

to

the

proper amount

respondent

for

of

appellant's

damages

breach of

conditional sale contract and did not abuse
cretion
in.

in

awarding

Judgment

to

the

to be
the

its dis-

respondent here-

There is sufficient evidence to support the trial

court's decision and this Court should not disturb the
amount of the Judgment.

POINT IV
APPELLANT COULD NOT PROPERLY REVOKE
HER ACCEPTANCE OF THE AUTOMOBILE
UNDER SECTION 70A-2-608, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED (1953, AS AMENDED) OR
RESCIND THE CONTRACT WHERE THERE
WAS NO DEFECT IN THE AUTOMOBILE.
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Appellant's

assertion .is

correct

that Utah

law allows the purchaser of defective goods to revoke
acceptance or rescind a contract where a defect exists
and is not discovered at the ·time of sale.,

However,

this provision is based on the premise that the buyer
receives an item whose defect substantially impairs its
valueQ

In other words, the buyer may revoke acceptance

within a reasonable time after discovering a defect and
before any substantial change in the goods occurs which
is not caused by
there

was

no

automobile.

the defect..

unknown

· Rather,

In the present case,

or discoverable

defect

in

the

it suffered a substantial change

in condition as a result of the abusive driving· habits
of appellant's son..
apparently

some

demise other
The

appellant

Appellant asserts that there was

in

defect

than

d~11ages

the

offers

the

no

car

which caused

its

caused by the driver c

explanation as

to what

the

"other defect" might have been and offers no proof as
to its existence.

On the c.ontrary, testimony at the

trial clearly indicated that the untimely demise of the
automobile
tices.

engine

resulted

from ·bad

driving

prac-

(R. 169 - 176)
The value of the car was substantially im-

paired not by any hidden defect but by its use in the
three

weeks

following

the

agreement

to

purchase.
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Appellant's son,

the principal driver of

the automo-

bile, had driven the car some 3,500 miles between March

(R. 217)

20 and April 15 of 1978.

Upon discovering

that the automobile would no longer run,
son abandoned it.
car,
it.

return

it

appellant's

Respondent was forced to pick up the

to the garage,

Thereafter,

appellant's

and attempt to repair
son

offered

to

resume

ownership or resume the contract if respondent would
agree to put a new engine in the car at no expense to
appellant.

Respondent

was

under

no

obligation

to

repair the automobile and violated no warranty duty in
refusing to repair or replace an engine that was of fit
and merchantable quality at the time of sale.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RESPONDENT.

The
respondent on

trial
the

court awarded attorney's
basis of

the

fees

contract between

to
the

parties which provided for an award of attorney's fees
upon a breach of contract.

Appellant has cited this as

error but seems to argue that the award of attorney's
fees

is

improper

only because

prevailed on the merits.
prevail on the merits,

appellant

However,

should

have

appellant did not

the trial court found in favor
-18-
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of

respondent,

based on

and

the

award of attorney's

the provisions of

the

fees

was

contract between

the

parties.
The case of Fullmer v. Blood,. 546 P.2d 606
(Utah,

1976),

is not applicable to the instant case,

In Fullmer, the trial court awarded Judgment to plaintiffs, although ruling against plaintiffs on one of the
The trial court

main issues -involved in the lawsuit.

then declined to award attorney's fees to either party,
and both parties appealed.

This Court· held that the

trial court had not abused its discretion in failing to

award attorney's fees, where each party had justification

for making

their respective claims

to

the real

property involved, and each party prevailed on one or
more issues at trial

are

clearly

failed

Cl

The facts of the instant case

distinguishable

in

that

to prevail on any issue at

the

appellant

trial and bad no

reasonable justification for her breach of the contract
between the parties, other than her reluctance to pay .
for the automobile after her son had damaged it.

CONCLUSION
Under Rule

40B of. the

Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, a grant or denial of a Motion for Contin-19-
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uance is discretionary with .the trial court and can be
granted only where good cause is shown.

In the present

case, the trial court exercised its discretion to deny
the Motion.

The denial was reasonable and there was no

substantial injustice to appellant.
raise the issue of failure
provisions

of

the

Appellant may not

to comply with the notice

Uniform Commercial

Code

on appeal

where she failed to raise that issue in her pleadings
or during trial.
lant

of

damages

the
for

sale

Further, the failure to notify appeldoes

not

the breach of

release

the

contract and

debtor
as

from

appellant

suffered no loss through failure to notify 1 there is no
reason

to overturn the Judgment.

the respondent consisted of full

Damages awarded

to

and fair relief for

breach of the contract calculated to return-respondent
to the position in which it would have been had appellant not breached

the

revoke

of

acceptance

agreemenL
the

Appellant may not

automobile

or

rescind

the

contract where there was no defect in the automobile.
The trial court's Judgment was proper and its award of
attorney's fees to the respondent was justified.
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RESPECTFULLY

of-----~---.-....( - - - - '

SUBMITTED

this

day

1980.

THOMAS N. ARNETT,
of and for
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P • •
32 Exchange Place,
Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
Attorneys for Respondent

-21--

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby declare that I delivered two copies
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent in Case No. 16847,

this

30th

day of May,

Parsons, Behle

&

Latimer,

South State Street, P ..

Utah

1980,

to David

s.

Dolowitz,

Attorney for Appellant,

o .. Box

11898, Salt Lake City,

841470
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